

**International Relations  
Candidacy Examination  
Autumn 2007  
(Day Two)**

ANSWER THREE QUESTIONS FROM THE FOLLOWING LIST OF TWELVE QUESTIONS. **YOU MAY NOT ANSWER MORE THAN TWO QUESTIONS FROM ANY ONE SECTION** (FP, IO, IPE, OR IS). YOU HAVE EIGHT HOURS TO COMPLETE THIS SECTION OF THE EXAM.

**International Organization**

1. There's been much ado about the democratic deficit at the global level. What is the democratic deficit; that is, what are the claimed dimensions of the problem? Do you agree that there is a deficit? If so, what should be done about it? Specifically, what kinds of institutional designs might be pursued to correct it? If you don't think it is a problem, defend why democracy should be a legitimating principle at the domestic level but not at the international level.

2. When the United Nations turned 60 in 2005, a major reform effort was launched. By far the most attention has been focused on the Security Council and especially the possibility of increasing its size and changing its composition to improve geographical representation. What would be some advantages and disadvantages of making the Council larger and more diverse? Given the concrete security problems facing the international community today, do you believe that a Council reformed along these lines would be more effective?

3. According to most received wisdom in International Relations, we should not expect powerful states to agree to the establishment of, and delegation of important responsibilities to, international organizations (IOs). And yet there are many examples of precisely this phenomenon. Why do powerful states sometimes agree to relinquish control to international institutions? Offer some examples to illustrate your argument. Then offer an example that illustrates the limits of this behavior, that is, a case where a powerful state has stood in the way of creation or delegation to an IO. What lessons can be derived from this latter example about the conditions under which powerful states are willing to delegate to IOs?

**International Security**

4. A central assumption in IR is that anarchy gives rise to fears for security, which is best pursued through self-help. Self-help doesn't preclude alliances, of

course, but alliances are fluid and fleeting and contingent on the balance of power. Yet, the real world doesn't necessarily reflect the assumption that states pursue security via self-help strategies – witness the continued existence of NATO after the end of the Cold War, the EU's CFSP/ESDP, and other security communities. What do such empirical observations of the ubiquity of security cooperation mean for the self-help assumption? Is self-help a realistic assumption and if so why? Even if it is not realistic, should we continue to assume it anyway on methodological grounds?

5. Since the end of the Cold War, has the U.S. pursued a coherent grand strategy? If not, why not? If so, what is current U.S. grand strategy? Does the U.S. need a grand strategy? Is grand strategy ever possible?

6. How has international relations theory changed after 9/11? Are IR theories now better equipped to deal with a more complex -- some even suggest de-secularized -- world? Or has the field of IR (like the U.S. government, perhaps) overreacted to 9/11?

### **International Political Economy**

7. International investment is increasingly important and is growing at a much faster rate than international trade. However, unlike trade policy, which is regulated at the international level through a well developed multilateral regime centered on the WTO (in addition to various regional bodies), cross-border investment is not governed by a robust multilateral regime. Instead, a decentralized patchwork of regional and especially bilateral investment treaties, mostly between developed and developing countries, have been signed. Why might this be the case? Why is investment governed on a bilateral rather than multilateral basis? (Note: There is no definitive answer to this question in the literature, so you should offer a creative explanation based on existing theories and on your own intuitions and empirical knowledge.)

8. What is the relationship between democracy and trade openness? Present the theoretical arguments behind this relationship and discuss the evidence.

9. Why does free trade occur sometimes and not others? Discuss some possible explanations derived from the literature (possibilities include, but are not limited to, structural explanations, domestic political explanations, and economic explanations). Then offer your assessment of how we can best understand the patterns of free trade in today's world. Are there characteristics of the contemporary world that make free trade dynamics different today than in the past?

### **Foreign Policy**

10. Using all the hindsight you want, evaluate the policies of deterrence and

containment during the Cold War. Did they work? Were they necessary? Did they make things better? worse? Did they make any real difference? Are there lessons from that experience that can be drawn for current US foreign policy?

11. In thinking about foreign policy in Asia, the Middle East and Europe should we concentrate on states or nations? What role should identity play in determining our conceptualization of collective actors? Explain why you feel that way by illustrating what difference it makes in how we analyze foreign policy in Asia, the Middle East and Europe.

12. There is a lot of talk about anti-Americanism abroad and about nationalistic attitudes inside the United States. Do these public opinions matter in foreign policy? What do we know about the relationship between mass opinion, elite opinion, and a leader's ability to shape public opinion? How much of this travels outside the United States?