

**International Relations
Candidacy Examination
Autumn 2010
(Day Two)**

ANSWER THREE QUESTIONS FROM THE FOLLOWING LIST OF TWELVE QUESTIONS. **YOU MAY NOT ANSWER MORE THAN TWO QUESTIONS FROM ANY ONE SECTION** (FP, IO, IPE, OR IS). YOU HAVE EIGHT HOURS TO COMPLETE THIS SECTION OF THE EXAM.

International Organization

1. IR theory has increasingly treated international institutions not just as exogenous constraints and social environments, but also as outcomes to be explained. One group of IR scholars argues that international institutions are rationally designed as efficient solutions to underlying cooperation problems. Do you agree? What are some alternative ways of thinking about institutional outcomes in IR?

2. When the United Nations turned 60 in 2005, a major reform effort was launched. By far the most attention has been focused on the Security Council and especially the possibility of increasing its size and changing its composition to improve geographical representation. What would be some advantages and disadvantages of making the Council larger and more diverse? Given the concrete security problems facing the international community today, do you believe that a Council reformed along these lines would be more effective?

3. The second half of the 20th century witnessed unprecedented developments in the creation of international organization and the use of multilateral instruments at large in both economic and security areas. There is hardly any doubt that the present period has shown a greater level of institutionalization than its 19th century predecessor, relying on multilateral arrangements rather than bilateral treaties or mere unilateral policies. More recently, the end of the Cold War has also been greeted by some as a new era in the strengthening of international institutions. What accounts for these changes?

International Security

4. A central assumption of structural realist theory since Waltz has been that “states seek survival.” The assumption seems straightforward enough, but Waltz does not unpack its content – nor do subsequent realists. In fact, it’s not entirely

clear what it means for a state to seek survival. Nor is it clear that survival-seeking accurately describes what states do – for example, it seems a stretch to say that European states are ‘survival-seekers’ as they willingly cede aspects of sovereignty to the EU. In your view what does it mean to assume states seek survival? Do you agree that they do, or that it’s a productive assumption? If not, what do states do and what (if any) assumption ought to guide structural theory?

5. What explains the ‘riddle of war’? Why do people engage in the deadly activity of fighting? Is war primarily rooted in human nature or is it a cultural invention? Under what conditions, if any, can war be eliminated; and is it declining at present?

6. The idea that the nature of technology affects the prospects for war and peace is simple, powerful, and intuitively plausible. Thus, the offense-defense balance concept has been used to explain the origins of interstate war, ethnic and civil conflict, arms control, arms racing, alliance behavior, military doctrine, the consequences of revolutions, grand strategy, and the structure of the international system. Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the way offense-defense balance theory has been used to address important historical, theoretical, and policy questions.

Foreign Policy

7. International sanctions short of military intervention have a bad reputation with experts who lament their inefficiency at ending targeted states’ delinquent behavior. Some even argue that sanctions actually have effects that are opposite of those that are intended, domestically consolidating the government’s power at the expense of the opposition and making it harder for the country’s foreign policy to change course. The case of Iran may be seen as an apt illustration of this problem. As a result, some theorists have suggested that positive incentives be used instead, whether alone or mixed with sanctions. Positive incentives, however, seem to lead to the reward of rogue behavior, an action that is hard to sell to democratic audiences. Moreover, the promise of reward may create an incentive for further rogue behavior. The case of North Korea is usually offered as an illustration of this perverse effect. If both negative and positive incentives fuel rogue behavior, then this would suggest that there is no efficient means of statecraft other than military intervention pure and simple as it happened with Iraq. What do you think?

8. Strategic thinking requires anticipating how developments today will affect the choices made by other states in the future. This is often done by assuming that through some political process states determine what is valuable, develop expectations of how likely it is that certain moves will advance these interests, and then update these expectations in light of experience. How do rational models expect each step of this process to work? What are the most important

findings from psychologists and behavioral economists that speak to how these processes do work? What do these findings imply regarding expectations about strategic interaction?

9. There is a lot of talk among Americans these days about a new Wilsonianism in Washington and the importance of morals concerns. At the same time, it seems almost no one outside the US takes the proposition that the US is motivated by moral concerns very seriously. They see this as just eyewash for nationalistic Americans who are attracted to a feel-good cover-story. Meantime, American realists like Mearsheimer and Walt attribute U.S. policy to neither morality nor U.S. strategic interests. For them it is driven by the interests of a U.S. ally. Why is there such huge variation in the interpretation of what makes the United States act as it does in world affairs and what does this imply for theory building? What is your favorite interpretation of the motivating forces behind U.S. policy and why does it convince you?

International Political Economy

10. International investment is increasingly important and is growing at a much faster rate than international trade. However, unlike trade policy, which is regulated at the international level through a well developed multilateral regime centered on the WTO (in addition to various regional bodies), cross-border investment is not governed by a robust multilateral regime. Instead, a decentralized patchwork of regional and especially bilateral investment treaties, mostly between developed and developing countries, have been signed. Why might this be the case? Why is investment governed on a bilateral rather than multilateral basis? (Note: There is no definitive answer to this question in the literature, so you should offer a creative explanation based on existing theories and on your own intuitions and empirical knowledge.)

11. What is the relationship between democracy and trade openness? Present the theoretical arguments behind this relationship and discuss the evidence.

12. Why does free trade occur sometimes and not others? Discuss some possible explanations derived from the literature (possibilities include, but are not limited to, structural explanations, domestic political explanations, and economic explanations). Then offer your assessment of how we can best understand the patterns of free trade in today's world. Are there characteristics of the contemporary world that make free trade dynamics different today than in the past?